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Abstract
■ Self-projection, the capacity to re-experience the personal
past and to mentally infer another personʼs perspective, has
been linked to medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC). In particular,
ventral mPFC is associated with inferences about oneʼs own self,
whereas dorsal mPFC is associated with inferences about an-
other individual. In the present fMRI study, we examined self-
projection using a novel camera technology, which employs a
sensor and timer to automatically take hundreds of photographs
when worn, in order to create dynamic visuospatial cues taken
from a first-person perspective. This allowed us to ask partici-
pants to self-project into the personal past or into the life of an-
other person. We predicted that self-projection to the personal
past would elicit greater activity in ventral mPFC, whereas self-
projection of another perspective would rely on dorsal mPFC.
There were three main findings supporting this prediction. First,
we found that self-projection to the personal past recruited greater
ventral mPFC, whereas observing another personʼs perspective
recruited dorsal mPFC. Second, activity in ventral versus dorsal
mPFC was sensitive to parametric modulation on each trial by
the ability to relive the personal past or to understand anotherʼs
perspective, respectively. Third, task-related functional connec-
tivity analysis revealed that ventral mPFC contributed to the me-
dial temporal lobe network linked to memory processes, whereas
dorsal mPFC contributed to the fronto-parietal network linked to
controlled processes. In sum, these results suggest that ventral–
dorsal subregions of the anterior midline are functionally disso-
ciable and may differentially contribute to self-projection of self
versus other. ■
INTRODUCTION
Self-projection is the capacity that allows us to shift our
perspective from the present moment to alternative tem-
poral and mental locations (Mitchell, 2009; Buckner &
Carroll, 2007; Suddendorf & Corballis, 2007). The neural
correlates supporting temporal simulations of the personal
past during autobiographical memory (AM) retrieval over-
lap with those supporting mental simulations of another
personʼs perspective during Theory of Mind (ToM) tasks
(for meta-analysis, see Spreng, Mar, & Kim, 2009). How-
ever, few functional neuroimaging studies have manipu-
lated self-projection within the same individual (although
see Rabin, Gilboa, Stuss, Mar, & Rosenbaum, 2010; Spreng
& Grady, 2010) while also using naturalistic stimuli. In the
present fMRI study, we examined temporal and mental
forms of self-projection using a novel camera technology
to create dynamic visuospatial cues which provided the
opportunity to step into the personal past or another indi-
vidualʼs perspective.
Functional neuroimaging studies have linked self-
projection to medial prefrontal cortex (mPFC; Mitchell,
2009). Medial PFC is involved in abstract forms of mental-
izing (Amodio & Frith, 2006; Gallagher & Frith, 2003) such
as integrating social information about the stable disposi-
tions of others and the self across time (Van Overwalle,
2009). Subregions within mPFC, however, may differen-
tially contribute to self-projection. Ventral mPFC is sensitive
to the ability to re-experience the self in time during AM
(Levine et al., 2004; Maguire & Mummery, 1999), and focal
lesions that overlap here impair the subjective experience
of re-experiencing the personal past (Wheeler & Stuss,
2003). Moreover, resting-state functional connectivity has
shown that subregions of mPFC comprise separable net-
works. Ventral mPFC is linked to the hippocampus and
other regions associated with the medial temporal lobe
(MTL) network (Kahn, Andrews-Hanna, Vincent, Snyder,
& Buckner, 2008; Vincent et al., 2007), a system of brain
regions important for internally directed processes, such
as memory. In contrast, dorsal mPFC is linked to dorso-
lateral PFC and lateral parietal cortices associated with the
fronto-parietal network (Vincent, Kahn, Snyder, Raichle, &
Buckner, 2008), a system of brain regions associated with1Duke University, 2University of Leeds, UK
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controlled processes. Ventral mPFC has been associated
with inferences about oneʼs own self, whereas dorsal mPFC
has been associated with inferences about another indi-
vidual (Krueger, Barbey, & Grafman, 2009; Mitchell, 2009;
Van Overwalle, 2009). However, there is considerable
debate regarding the functional specialization of mPFC
with respect to self versus other processing (Northoff
et al., 2006).
The goal of the present fMRI study was to examine self-
projection of self versus other elicited by naturalistic stim-
uli within the same individuals by employing a novel
camera technology. We tested three main predictions re-
garding the role of mPFC, which were based on the evi-
dence regarding ventral and dorsal subregions in self
versus other processing (Krueger et al., 2009; Mitchell,
2009; VanOverwalle, 2009). First, ventral mPFCwill be pref-
erentially recruited during self-projection of self, whereas
dorsal mPFC will be recruited to a greater extent for self-
projection of other. Second, ventral versus dorsalmPFCwill
be sensitive to variability in the ability to re-experience the
personal past and to understand anotherʼs perspective.
Third, ventral versus dorsal mPFC will be functionally con-
nected to separable neural networks contributing to self-
projection of self versus other.
METHODS
Participants
The study recruited 23 participants (12 women; mean
age = 23.7, SD = 3.6) who were healthy, right-handed,
and without history of neurological or psychiatric episodes.
Participants gave written informed consent for a protocol
approved by the Duke University Institutional Review
Board.
Procedure
SenseCam
SenseCam (http://research.microsoft.com/en-us/um/
cambridge/projects/sensecam/) is a small wearable digital
camera that has electronic sensors (e.g., light, heat,motion)
which can automatically and silently trigger thousands of
photographs in a single day (see Figure 1A). This differs
Figure 1. SenseCam. (A) The SenseCam is a small wearable device that takes photographs automatically, without input from the user. (B) SenseCam
images acquired during a trip to the ice-cream shop. (C) The experimental design depicting the study conditions.
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considerably from the normal way in which we can use a
camera to generate retrieval cues (St. Jacques, Rubin, Labar,
& Cabeza, 2008; Cabeza et al., 2004) because it does not
disrupt the ongoing experience of events through the act
of taking a photograph (also see Levine et al., 2004). Several
photographs taken from a particular event (e.g., eating ice-
cream; see Figure 1B) can be consecutively viewed to cre-
ate a dynamic visuospatial cue (www.youtube.com/watch?
v=sr1i-sICafs). The SenseCam lens also maximizes the
field of view to better capture the perspective of the wear-
er by incorporating a wide-angle (fish-eye) lens. In sum,
the SenseCam captures dynamic images taken from the
first-person perspective, which provide highly effective
cues for self-projection to alternative self versus other
perspectives.
Prospective Collection
Retrieval cues were prospectively collected, such that par-
ticipants were asked to keep a record of their lives prior
to the scanning session by wearing the SenseCam. Partici-
pants wore the SenseCam for 6 days and kept a schedule
of each dayʼs activities to be used to parse the SenseCam
images into events. The daily schedule was recorded at
the end of each day, along with a unique identifier to dis-
tinguish that particular day from others (e.g., “Today was
the day I had lunch with Ben”). Participants were instructed
to write about 10 to 15 brief sentences, one for each major
event during the day (e.g., “Had breakfast,” “went to the
grocery store”) which were used to segregate the images
into events.
Cue Selection
Three days were randomly assigned to elicit self-projection
of oneʼs own self (SPS). The content of the remaining 3 days
was used for an analysis that was not the main focus of
the present investigation (St. Jacques, Conway, & Cabeza,
under review). For each day, 12 events were selected to
be tested in the scanner. To elicit self-projection of other
perspectives (SPO), images were collected by three volun-
teers who wore a SenseCam in locations at least 100 miles
away from Duke University and whose lifestyles differed
from the participants. Images in the SPOconditiondepicted
events thatwould have been familiar to the participants (e.g.,
going to the grocery store, eating at a restaurant), but which
were not self-relevant, thus minimizing the likelihood that
the other-perspective condition would include pictures of
self-relevant people, places, and activities, which might in-
advertently trigger AMs. Debriefing following the scanning
session indicated that the SPO images were familiar to
many of the participants, but did not trigger personal mem-
ories. The SPO images were also carefully selected to be
similar to the SPS images (indoor/outdoor, time of day,
etc.). Images in both conditions were selected to ensure
good picture quality.
fMRI Scanning
The scanning session took place one week following the
last day the SenseCam was worn (mean length of delay =
8 days, SD = 1.2). There were a total of nine fMRI runs
blocked by condition and presented in an alternating order
(i.e., ABCABCABC), counterbalanced across participants
based on a Latin square design. Three of the separate runs
consisted of another condition, which was included for a
separate analysis. The structure of the remaining six runs
was similar in each condition (see Figure 1C). Each of these
runs began with a 10-sec title screen (i.e., “Today was the
day I…”) and consisted of 12 cues presented in chrono-
logical order from that day, for a total of 36 events per con-
dition across 3 runs. Cues were presented for 20 sec, and
participants were instructed to recall the events depicted
from their own perspective (SCS) or to understand the
events being depicted from another personʼs perspective
(SCO). The cues in each condition consisted of 40 Sense-
Cam pictures depicting a single event and presented at a
rate of two pictures per second.
Following each cue presentation, participants indicated
their subjective experience. In the SPS condition, par-
ticipants rated the subjective experience of recollection,
reliving, which refers to how much they were able to re-
experience the event depicted as if it were happening right
now or as if they were mentally traveling back to the time
when the event occurred. It is important to note that reliv-
ing is similar to other subjective measures of recollection,
such as the remember/know paradigm (for a review, see
Yonelinas, 2002). For example, in the remember/know
paradigm, participants are asked to use introspection to
classify items as recollected (vivid re-experiencing of the
original event and its context) or merely familiar. Although
introspection has its limitations, the results of hundreds
of remember/know studies are highly consistent with find-
ings of hundreds of studies using objective measures of
recollection, such as source memory (Yonelinas, 2002).
However, there are some critical differences between the
reliving scale and the remember/know paradigm, which
make the reliving scale a better measure for AM. First,
the reliving scale could be considered a better subjective
measure of recollection in AM than the remember/know
paradigm because it does not require the assumption
of a dual-process model (Wixted, 2007; Yonelinas, 2002).
Second, reliving is a better predictor of recollection in
AMs compared to the remember/know scale, which is a
better predictor of confidence in AMs (Rubin, Schrauf, &
Greenberg, 2004; Rubin, Burt, & Fifield, 2003). In the
SPO condition, participants were asked to indicate the
amount of understanding of the other personʼs pers-
pective. While taking another personʼs perspective, par-
ticipants were instructed to try to understand what was
happening, where the event was taking place, and why
the event was occurring. Ratings were conducted on an
8-point scale from low to high, and were self-paced (up to
6 sec). Following a response, a fixation cross was presented
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for a jittered interval between 4 and 8 sec plus any remain-
ing time from the response period.
fMRI Methods
Image Acquisition
Scanning was conducted using a 4-T GE magnet. Anatomi-
cal scanning included a T1-weighted sagittal localizer series
and 3-D fast spoiled gradient-echo recalled (SPGR) struc-
tural images were acquired in the coronal plane (2562 ma-
trix, TR=12.3msec, TE=5.4msec, flip angle=20°, FOV=
240, 68 slices, 1.9 mm slice thickness). Coplanar functional
images were acquired using an inverse spiral sequence (642
image matrix, TR = 2000 msec, TE = 6 msec, FOV = 240,
flip angle = 60°, 34 slices, 3.8 mm slice thickness).
fMRI Analyses
Image processing and analyses were performed using Sta-
tistical Parametric Mapping software in Matlab (SPM5; Well-
come Department of Imaging Neuroscience). Functional
images were corrected for slice acquisition order, realigned
to correct formotion artifacts, spatially normalized to a stan-
dard stereotactic space, and spatially smoothed using an
8-mm isotropic Gaussian kernel. Coordinates are reported
in Talairach space using a transformation from theMontreal
Neurological Institute coordinates (Brett, Christoff, Cusack,
& Lancaster, 2001).
Self-projection of Self versus Other
To examine activation differences between self versus other
self-projection during the presentation of the SenseCam
images, we used a Finite Impulse Response (FIR) basis func-
tion. The FIR approach allowed us to examine potential ac-
tivation differences without assuming a particular canonical
hemodynamic response function, and thus, was appropri-
ate for the complex and temporally protracted processes
elicited in the present study. The FIR model included 16 re-
gressors of peristimulus time bins of 2 sec duration (equal
to the TR) for each condition, yielding estimates of fMRI
signal change across the entire trial period (SenseCam pre-
sentation and rating).
Weconducted aCondition (SPS, SPO)×Time (0 to20 sec)
ANOVA implemented in SPM5 in order to isolate activa-
tion differences in the self versus other conditions across
the FIR timepoints associated with the presentation of the
SenseCam images. We examined the main effect of con-
dition at an FDR-corrected threshold of p = .05 using a
two-voxel extent threshold, and inclusively masked with
the effect of interest (SPS > SPO or SPO > SPS) at p =
.05 to determine the direction of the effect. An extent
threshold of 2 voxels was chosen here because the ROI ap-
proach combined with a corrected threshold was consid-
ered very conservative. Further, we took an ROI approach
to examine brain regions associated with self versus other
self-projection in the present study based on a previous
quantitative meta-analysis which generated activation
likelihood estimation maps corresponding to statistically
significant concordance of activated voxels in 19 AM and
50 ToM studies (Spreng et al., 2009).
Parametric Modulation by Behavior
To examine the neural correlates associated with self ver-
sus other self-projection that was sensitive to on-line be-
havioral responses, we employed a parametric approach.
To identify increases in activity as a function of increasing
behavioral responses on each trial, we created a GLM in
which temporal versus mental self-projection was modu-
lated by reliving and understanding using the first-order
Table 1. Self-projection of Self vs. Other
Region BA x y z F Voxels
SPO > SPS
Dorsal mPFC 9 −7 38 33 14.17 12
9 −11 56 25 13.67 5
Dorsolateral PFC 9 19 49 33 30.51 12
Ventral parietal cortex 39 −45 −67 38 15.26 5
40 −56 −57 27 12.59 7
40 52 −53 34 10.93 5
SPS > SPO
Ventral mPFC 10 −7 54 −3 53.56 51
Fronto-polar cortex 10 −37 48 12 80.47 18
Ventrolateral PFC 45 −41 23 16 17.94 9
47 −45 14 −7 6.79 2
47 −41 29 −8 6.73 3
47 52 29 −5 17.06 3
Anterior cingulate 24 −7 30 20 32.01 7
Supplemental motor area 6 4 10 52 16.61 7
Thalamus – 4 −7 0 42.34 8
Temporo-polar cortex 38 −37 17 −26 24.59 12
Middle temporal cortex 21 −52 −15 −12 27.71 17
21 41 −8 −9 17.46 5
Superior temporal cortex 22 −45 −57 17 25.61 22
Hippocampus – −22 −12 −15 28.68 71
Retrosplenial cortex 29 0 −51 6 20.00 10
Posterior cingulate 31 −7 −31 33 19.20 2
Ventral parietal cortex 39 −37 −75 25 14.31 11
Talairach coordinates reported. BA=Brodmannʼs area; PFC=prefrontal
cortex; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex.
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parametric modulation option integrated in SPM5. Subse-
quently, random effects analyses were performed on the
parameter estimate of the parametric regressor for the be-
havioral response. We used the results of the one-sample
t test ( p = .05) reflecting activity modulated by reliving or
understanding as an inclusive mask to determine whether
the regions showing activation differences in self versus
other self-projection were also sensitive to behavior.
Task-related Functional Connectivity Analysis
Seedvoxels in ventral versusdorsalmPFC thatwere identified
in our previous analysis on self versus other self-projection
were further interrogated to examine the task-related net-
work of brain regions functionally connected with disso-
ciable mPFC regions. We should note that in the present
article we refer to dorsal mPFC (z-axis on Talairach atlas:
>20 mm) and ventral mPFC (z-axis on Talairach atlas:
<20 mm to >−15 mm; e.g., Krueger et al., 2009; Van
Overwalle, 2009), however, the particular naming conven-
tion may differ among authors (e.g., Buckner, Andrews-
Hanna, & Schacter, 2008; Northoff & Bermpohl, 2004).
To find these functional connectivity maps, we employed
a second analysis based on individual trial activity (Rissman,
Gazzaley, & DʼEsposito, 2004). Specifically, we first created
a GLM in which each individual trial was modeled by a
separate covariate, thus yielding different parameter esti-
mates for each individual trial and for each individual
subject. The resulting correlation maps were Fisher trans-
formed to allow for statistical comparison. Then, to exam-
ine differences in functional connectivity of ventral versus
dorsal mPFC regions associated with temporal versus men-
tal self-projection, we conducted a two-sample t test in
SPM5 using an FDR-corrected threshold of p = .05, and a
two-voxel extent threshold.
RESULTS
Behavioral
SPSwas associatedwith amean reliving rating of 5.04 (SD=
0.56; RT = 1.42 sec, SD = 0.67), and SPO was associated
with a mean understanding rating of 4.50 (SD = 0.86; RT =
1.35 sec, SD = 0.61). There were no significant differ-
ences in the reaction time across the twoconditions (Cohenʼs
d = 0.11). The behavioral results suggest that the Sense-
Cam images evoked a strong ability to re-experience the
personal past and to comprehend another individualʼs
perspective.
Figure 2. Self-projection of self versus other. There was a dorsal (A) versus ventral (B) distinction in the recruitment of mPFC during self versus
other self-projection. BA = Brodmannʼs area.
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fMRI
Self-projection of Self versus Other
The results of the self versus other self-projection revealed a
dorsal versus ventral distinction inmPFC (seeTable 1 andFig-
ure 2). There was greater activity in the dorsal mPFC during
SPO compared to SPS (Figure 2A). Additionally, the SPO >
SPS contrast revealed greater recruitment of right dorsolat-
eral PFC and ventral parietal cortices. In contrast, there was
greater recruitment of the ventral mPFC during self versus
other self-projection (Figure 2B). Additionally, the SPS >
SPO contrast revealed greater recruitment in several regions
associated with AM retrieval (Cabeza & St. Jacques, 2007), in-
cluding the left hippocampus, lateral temporal, posterior
midline, and bilateral ventrolateral PFC. Interestingly, the
difference between SPS versus SPO was reflected by less
deactivation in ventral mPFC but greater activity in dorsal
mPFC, which is a pattern of findings consistent with others
(Gusnard, Akbudak, Shulman, & Raichle, 2001), and linked
to a default state of cognitive processing (Gusnard, Raichle,
& Raichle, 2001). In sum, these results suggest that ventral
versus dorsal subregions of PFC contribute to separable
forms of self-projection.
Parametric Modulation of Behavior
In order to directly link activation differences in self-
projection to behavior, we examined activity in the above
regions that was modulated on each trial by the extent of
reliving in the case of SPS, and understanding in the case of
SPO (see Table 2 and Figure 3). We found greater modula-
tion of ventral mPFC during highly relived trials for SPS, but
no modulation by understanding in this same region for
SPO. In contrast, there was greater modulation of dorsal
mPFC by better understanding for SPO, but no modulation
in this region by reliving for SPS. In sum, these results
show that activity in ventral mPFC is sensitive to reliving
when taking oneʼs own past perspective during memory
retrieval, whereas activity in dorsal mPFC is sensitive to bet-
ter understanding when projecting oneʼs self onto a dif-
ferent mental perspective.
Table 2. Parametric Modulation by Behavior
Region BA x y z F Voxels
SPS: Understanding
Dorsal mPFC 9 −7 38 33 14.17 6
9 19 49 36 26.63 4
Ventral parietal cortex 39 −45 −67 42 13.38 4
SPO: Reliving
Ventral mPFC 10 −7 47 −6 21.66 8
Anterior cingulate 24 −4 34 16 31.90 6
24 0 37 5 24.70 12
Supplemental motor area 6 4 10 52 16.61 5
Thalamus – 4 −7 0 42.34 6
Temporo-polar cortex 38 −37 17 −26 24.59 7
Middle temporal cortex 21 −56 −15 −15 22.29 6
Superior temporal cortex 22 −45 −57 17 25.61 22
Hippocampus – −22 −12 −15 28.68 33
Retrosplenial cortex 29 0 −51 6 20.00 9
Talairach coordinates reported. BA=Brodmannʼs area; PFC=prefrontal
cortex; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex.
Figure 3. Parametric modulation of behavior. Ventral versus dorsal mPFC modulated the amount of reliving during self-projection of oneʼs
own self (SPS) and the amount of understanding during self-projection of another perspective (SPO), respectively. The graphs depict high
and low ratings based on a median split; however, the parametric analysis is based on the continuous ratings. BA = Brodmannʼs area.
1280 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 6
Task-related Functional Connectivity Analysis
For examining functional connectivity, we used the peak
voxels identified in the ventral and dorsal mPFC regions en-
gaged by self versus other self-projection as seed voxels in
individual trial-based analyses. These analyses revealed that
ventral versus dorsal mPFC showed task-related functional
connectivity with MTL and fronto-parietal networks (see
Table 3 and Figure 4). Ventral mPFC showed greater co-
activation with the left hippocampus and precuneus, com-
pared to dorsal mPFC. In contrast, dorsal mPFC showed
greater coactivation with bilateral frontal and parietal re-
gions, compared to ventral mPFC. The pattern of functional
connectivity of these ventral versus dorsal mPFC regions is
consistent with previous studies examining spontaneous
patterns of coherent activity during passive resting state,
which have revealed an MTL network (Kahn et al., 2008;
Vincent et al., 2006) and a fronto-parietal network (Vincent
et al., 2008). In sum, the findings from the functional con-
nectivity analysis provide strong support for the dissociable
role of dorsal versus ventral mPFC in self versus other self-
projection.
DISCUSSION
Thepresent fMRI study investigated the neuralmechanisms
underlying self-projection to the personal past and into the
life of another person within the same individuals via natu-
ralistic stimuli that were prospectively generated using a
novel camera technology. Our data indicate that there is
a ventral versus dorsal distinction in mPFC during self-
projection relying on shifts in perspective from oneʼs own
self versus another individual. There were three main find-
ings supporting this result. First, we found that temporal
self-projection into the personal past recruited greater
ventral mPFC, whereas mental self-projection into another
personʼs perspective recruited greater dorsal mPFC. Sec-
ond, activity in ventral versus dorsal mPFC was sensitive
to parametric modulation on each trial by the ability to re-
live the personal past or to understand anotherʼs perspec-
tive. Third, task-related functional connectivity analysis
revealed that ventral mPFC contributed to the medial tem-
poral lobe network linked to memory processes, whereas
dorsal mPFC contributed to the fronto-parietal network
linked to controlled processes.
mPFC is a critical node in the network of regions sup-
porting tasks relying on self-projection such as AM retrieval
(Mitchell, 2009; Spreng et al., 2009; Buckner & Carroll,
2007) and ToM (Mitchell, 2009; Spreng et al., 2009; Buckner
& Carroll, 2007). Here we show that ventral versus dorsal
mPFC may differentially support self versus other forms of
self-projection during these tasks. The mPFC coordinates
reported here also overlap with those found by a previ-
ous meta-analyses on social cognition (Van Overwalle,
2009) and one on self-referential processing (Northoff
et al., 2006). The exact role of particular subregions within
mPFC has been a matter of considerable debate, with
some studies observing recruitment of ventral mPFC when
making inferences about oneʼs own self and dorsal mPFC
when mentalizing about others (Krueger et al., 2009; Van
Overwalle, 2009; also see Spreng et al., 2009), and other
studies observing that both dorsal and ventral mPFC re-
cruited during self-referential processes (Northoff et al.,
2006). The recruitment of particular subregions of mPFC
during self-projection may vary according to the degree
of personal relevance. Consistent with this idea, in a series
of studies,Mitchell and colleagues (Ames, Jenkins, Banaji, &
Mitchell, 2008; Jenkins, Macrae, & Mitchell, 2008; Mitchell,
Table 3. Task-related Functional Connectivity of Medial
Prefrontal Cortex during Self-projection of Self vs. Other
Region BA x y z t Voxels
SPO > SPS
Dorsal mPFC 9 −7 38 30 17.08 645
Dorsolateral PFC 9 −52 24 34 4.8 132
9 45 35 37 3.35 2
46 48 37 16 3.29 4
Ventrolateral PFC 47 −52 36 −2 4.84 29
47 −52 18 −4 4.19 11
Orbito-frontal cortex 11 −45 43 −18 4.32 30
11/47 48 43 −9 3.72 5
Fronto-polar
cortex
10 26 51 −3 3.61 2
Claustrum – −22 21 −7 4.55 11
– 22 21 −7 5.71 48
Middle temporal
cortex
21 −56 −30 −11 3.4 4
21 63 −33 −14 3.46 14
21 67 −26 −8 3.23 2
Superior temporal
cortex
41 41 −33 5 3.66 3
Precuneus 7 15 −78 46 3.82 2
Dorsal parietal
cortex
7/40 −45 −48 55 6.04 300
7/40 48 −49 48 5.02 162
Cerebellum – −37 −60 −29 4.54 83
– −15 −81 −22 3.79 5
– 37 −67 −25 4.67 42
SPS > SPO
Ventral mPFC 10 −7 55 1 17.3 277
Hippocampus – 26 −22 −12 4.11 2
Precuneus 7 −11 −49 48 5.09 2
Talairach coordinates reported. BA=Brodmannʼs area; PFC=prefrontal
cortex; mPFC = medial prefrontal cortex.
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Macrae, & Banaji, 2006; Mitchell, Banaji, & Macrae, 2005)
found that ventral mPFC was recruited to a greater extent
when mentalizing about similar others (e.g., people with
the same political beliefs), presumably because they could
relymoreon the retrieval of information from their own life.
In contrast, dorsal mPFC was recruited more when making
inferences about dissimilar others. In the case of the current
study, we found dorsal mPFC for a dissimilar other and ven-
tralmPFC for a very similar other—oneʼs own past self. Two
previous studies investigating self-projection within the
same individuals also found greater recruitment of ventral
mPFC for AM versus ToM, but they did not observe dif-
ferences in the recruitment of dorsal mPFC (Rabin et al.,
2010; Spreng & Grady, 2010). Control over the use of
the first-person perspective during self-projection (e.g.,
DʼArgembeau et al., 2007), employment of naturalistic
dynamic visuospatial cues, and other methodological differ-
ences may potentially account for the observed difference
between the current and previous studies.
The recruitment of mPFC also modulated the extent
of self-projection to the personal past or into the life of
another person. Ventral mPFC was recruited to a greater
extent when temporal self-projection involved greater re-
experience of the personal past as measured by subjec-
tive ratings of the amount of reliving. These results are
consistent with prior functional neuroimaging studies
showing that ventral mPFC is sensitive to the ability to re-
experience the self in time during AM (Levine et al., 2004;
Maguire & Mummery, 1999), and with patient studies
showing that lesions with overlap here impair the sub-
jective experience of re-experiencing the personal past
(Wheeler & Stuss, 2003). In contrast, dorsal mPFC was re-
cruited to a greater extent when mental self-projection
involved better understanding of another personʼs per-
spective. Dorsal mPFC is recruited during tasks that rely
on evaluation (Northoff et al., 2006) such as during impres-
sion formation of another individual (Mitchell, Neil Macrae,
& Banaji, 2005). The sensitivity of dorsal mPFC to better
understand a dissimilar other may reflect increased reliance
on rule-based strategies to infer an alternative perspective.
Ventral versus dorsal mPFC were functionally connected
to separate neural networks, which differentially con-
tributed to self-projection. Ventral mPFC showed greater
functional connectivity with the hippocampus and precu-
neus, a pattern of results consistent with the MTL network
supportingmemory (Kahn et al., 2008; Vincent et al., 2006),
whereas dorsal mPFC showed greater functional connec-
tivity with lateral frontal, fronto-polar, and dorsal parietal
cortices, a pattern of functional connectivity which is con-
sistent with the fronto-parietal network supporting con-
trolled processes (Vincent et al., 2008). The MTL network
is a subsystem of the default network, the set of brain re-
gions that are coactive during passive resting states and as-
sociated with internally directed processes such as memory
(Buckner et al., 2008). Greater involvement of the MTL
network during self-projection to the personal past is con-
sistent with the idea that the ability to take oneʼs own per-
spective may rely upon the recovery of memory details. In
Figure 4. Task-related
functional connectivity analysis.
Ventral versus dorsal mPFC
were functionally connected to
separate neural networks
during self-projection of oneʼs
own self (SPS; orange/red
activation) versus self-
projection of another
perspective (SPO; blue
activation). The activation in
showing the results of the
functional connectivity in each
condition was projected to the
cortical surface using CARET.
1282 Journal of Cognitive Neuroscience Volume 23, Number 6
contrast, the fronto-parietal network supports the initiation
and flexible adjustment of controlled processes (Dosenbach,
Fair, Cohen, Schlaggar, & Petersen, 2008). Vincent et al.
(2008) suggested that the fronto-parietal network may
contribute to the integration between externally directed
attention and internally directed thought, given that it is
anatomically juxtaposed between the dorsal attention
and default networks. These types of controlled process-
ing may be particularly important during self-projection
into the life of another person, which potentially involves
greater integration between an externally presented per-
spective and internally directed processes. The functional
dissociation between the neural networks supporting
self-projection observed in the present study is also con-
sistent with evidence that AM and ToM are independent
(Rosenbaum, Stuss, Levine, & Tulving, 2007).
AlthoughmPFC is frequently observed in tasks relying on
self-projection (Spreng et al., 2009), it is also one of the
most frequent regions observed during emotional tasks
(Phan, Wager, Taylor, & Liberzon, 2002). Very few studies
have controlled for both self-reference and emotion within
the same individuals, thus it is difficult to definitively dis-
tinguish these processes (for a meta-analysis, see Gilbert
et al., 2006). However, one study found that ventral mPFC
was sensitive to the self-relevance of stimuli irrespective of
emotion (Moran, Macrae, Heatherton, Wyland, & Kelley,
2006). In the present study, the elicitation of emotional re-
sponses during self-projection was minimized because the
SenseCam images depicted very recent, everyday events
(attending class, studying, etc.). Moreover, thedorsal versus
ventral distinction observed in the current study would be
difficult to explain based on the role of these mPFC subre-
gions in emotion (e.g.,Dolcos, LaBar,&Cabeza, 2004). Thus,
the pattern of results observed in the present study is more
consistent with the suggestion that the ventral versus dorsal
distinction in mPFC is related to differences in the nature of
self-projection rather than emotion. Future studies, how-
ever, should directly manipulate the elicitation of emotion
during self-projection for self versus other.
Conclusions
The dynamic visuospatial cues employed in the current
study provided a novel way to investigate self-projection
of oneʼs own life or the life of another individual. We found
a ventral versus dorsal distinction in the recruitment of
mPFC for self versus other shifts in perspective. Further,
ventral mPFC modulated the extent to which oneʼs own
perspective was re-experienced, whereas dorsal mPFC
modulated the ability to understand an alternative perspec-
tive. Supporting the dissociable role of these mPFC subre-
gions during different forms of self-projection, task-related
functional connectivity analysis revealed that ventral versus
dorsal mPFC were nodes in different neural networks.
Ventral mPFC contributed to the MTL network linked to
memory processes, whereas dorsal mPFC contributed to
the fronto-parietal network linked to controlled processes.
In sum, the results of the current study suggest that mPFC
contributes to shifts from the present moment to alterna-
tive self and other perspectives.
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